Manchester United’s INEOS Era Has Become a Crisis of Decision-Making
Manchester United have reached another managerial crossroads.
The uncomfortable part for INEOS is that they have been here before.
Erik ten Hag was reviewed, backed, extended and dismissed. Ruben Amorim was identified as the man to replace him, despite inheriting a squad poorly suited to the football he was famous for, and lasted 14 months. Michael Carrick arrived as an interim solution, exceeded expectations, earned the permanent job and now finds himself presiding over United’s worst Premier League start at this stage of a season since 1986/87.
After Sunday’s 3-0 home defeat to Bournemouth, United sit one point above the relegation zone with seven points from eight league matches. They have won only two of 12 games in all competitions this season.
The immediate question is obvious.
Should Carrick remain Manchester United manager?
But there is another question INEOS should find considerably more uncomfortable.
Have the people deciding his future earned the right to choose what comes next?
Because almost three years into INEOS’ control of Manchester United’s football operations, the problem is no longer simply that individual decisions have failed.
It is that one decision after another has reduced the club’s room to make the next one.
INEOS were supposed to bring competence
When Sir Jim Ratcliffe’s investment in Manchester United was completed in 2024, the attraction was never simply fresh capital.
Manchester United had money.
What they had lacked for years was a coherent football structure.
The post-Sir Alex Ferguson era had become a graveyard of managerial appointments, recruitment strategies and supposed resets. David Moyes, Louis van Gaal, Jose Mourinho, Ole Gunnar Solskjaer and Erik ten Hag all arrived through different processes and with different philosophies.
None created sustainable success.
INEOS presented itself as the alternative to that dysfunction.
The club built a new executive structure. Omar Berrada arrived from Manchester City as chief executive. Jason Wilcox joined the football leadership. Dan Ashworth was pursued for months before eventually arriving from Newcastle United as sporting director.
Manchester United’s own financial reporting described the objective as installing a new executive leadership team across the business and sporting operation, creating a more streamlined and sustainable organisation.
This was supposed to be the adult supervision United had lacked.
Experienced football executives would build the structure.
The structure would establish the philosophy.
The philosophy would guide recruitment.
And eventually the manager would become one important part of the machine rather than the person around whom the entire club rotated.
It sounded sensible.
Then came the first major decision.
The FA Cup changed everything
Erik ten Hag entered the 2024 FA Cup final with his position under considerable pressure.
United had finished eighth in the Premier League, their worst finish in the competition’s history. Yet at Wembley they produced arguably their best performance of the season, beating Manchester City 2-1 to win the FA Cup.
Emotion has always been dangerous in football.
A disastrous league campaign suddenly ended with silverware, celebrations and genuine optimism.
INEOS conducted its review.
The conclusion was that Ten Hag should remain.
On July 4, United extended his contract until June 2026. Dan Ashworth publicly said the review had reached a clear conclusion that Ten Hag was the best partner to improve standards and results.
That decision was not indefensible.
Ten Hag had won two trophies in two seasons. Injuries had devastated his squad. There was an argument that a stronger football structure around him might improve both recruitment and performance.
INEOS was entitled to make that judgment.
The problem is what happened next.
United refreshed Ten Hag’s coaching staff, spent heavily during the summer and spoke publicly about alignment between the manager and the new football operation.
Then, on October 28, Ten Hag was sacked.
United were 14th in the Premier League.
The manager INEOS had reviewed and decided was the correct man in June was gone before November.
That immediately created an uncomfortable question.
If Ten Hag’s deficiencies became obvious enough to justify dismissal 13 matches into the season, how rigorous had the summer review really been?
This is where hindsight has to be resisted.
Keeping Ten Hag was understandable.
Sacking Ten Hag after the subsequent results was understandable too.
What is harder to understand is how both conclusions could be reached within a matter of months while United committed significant money and another preseason to the same project.
The FA Cup victory may not have made the decision for INEOS.
But it became impossible to ignore how dramatically one afternoon at Wembley altered the conversation surrounding a manager whose league season had given them plenty of evidence already.
United had made the first major decision of the new era.
Within months, they were reversing it.
Amorim presented a different contradiction
United then moved quickly for Ruben Amorim.
Again, the appointment itself was understandable.
Amorim had built one of Europe’s most compelling young teams at Sporting. He was highly regarded, tactically distinctive and had already demonstrated that he could build a clear identity.
If United wanted a modern coach with conviction, Amorim fit the description.
But his conviction was precisely why the appointment required careful planning.
Amorim’s football was built around a back three.
His Sporting sides used wing-backs aggressively, relied on carefully structured buildup patterns and required specific profiles across midfield and attack.
United did not possess a squad naturally constructed for that football.
That was evident almost immediately.
After Amorim’s first match, a 1-1 draw against Ipswich Town, he acknowledged that his players were confused by elements of the new 3-4-3 system and that implementing his ideas would take time.
That was not Amorim deceiving Manchester United.
It was Amorim being Amorim.
INEOS knew who they were appointing.
This matters because the easiest interpretation of his eventual failure is that Amorim stubbornly refused to adapt.
There is truth in that.
By the time United dismissed him in January 2026, reporting indicated the club had become increasingly frustrated by his unwillingness to alter aspects of his tactical approach as circumstances changed.
Amorim deserves responsibility for that.
A manager at Manchester United cannot simply insist that reality conform to his preferred system.
But INEOS deserves scrutiny too.
If the inherited squad was so poorly suited to Amorim’s principles, why appoint him in the middle of a season and expect an immediate transition?
Analysis of the squad at the time suggested the 3-4-3 was among the least natural formations for the players available, particularly given the need for athletic wing-backs, specialised attacking midfielders and a reliable centre-forward.
United had appointed a coach with one of the clearest tactical identities in European football.
Then they discovered that his tactical identity created problems.
That is not merely a coaching failure.
It is a recruitment question.
Then Dan Ashworth disappeared
The confusion became more significant because of what happened behind the manager.
Manchester United spent months pursuing Dan Ashworth.
Newcastle placed him on gardening leave. Negotiations over compensation dragged on. Sir Jim Ratcliffe publicly described him as one of the best sporting directors in football.
United eventually secured him in July 2024.
Five months later, he was gone.
The club described the departure as a mutual agreement. Reporting at the time pointed to broader disagreements inside the new football structure, with questions surrounding managerial strategy among the issues under discussion.
It would be irresponsible to state that Amorim’s appointment alone caused Ashworth’s departure.
There has never been definitive public confirmation of that.
But the timing remains extraordinary.
INEOS spent months fighting to acquire an executive it considered among the best in the industry, reportedly paid Newcastle millions in compensation, then separated from him before he had completed half a season in the role.
The point is not that successful organisations never change executives.
They do.
Sometimes recognising a poor fit quickly is better than preserving one for appearances.
But United were supposed to be building institutional stability.
Instead, one of the architects of the new structure disappeared almost immediately.
The structure itself had become part of the story.
The cost-cutting makes the football mistakes harder to ignore
There is another uncomfortable layer to INEOS’ tenure.
Manchester United have undertaken significant cost reductions away from the pitch.
Around 250 roles were cut during the first restructuring programme in 2024. A further 150 to 200 proposed job cuts followed in 2025 as the club sought to return to profitability after five consecutive years of losses. Other cost-saving measures were introduced throughout the organisation.
Some of that restructuring may have been financially necessary.
Manchester United had allowed costs to grow substantially while sporting performance declined.
A club cannot pretend financial reality does not exist simply because its revenues are enormous.
But austerity elsewhere puts even greater pressure on the football department to make intelligent decisions.
Amorim’s dismissal illustrates why.
United’s financial statements recorded a £6.3 million write-off connected to Amorim and members of his coaching team, alongside a provision of up to £15.9 million for potential future settlement payments.
Those are the costs of football decisions.
And they sit awkwardly beside an ownership group asking employees elsewhere in the organisation to accept redundancies in the name of efficiency.
INEOS cannot eliminate every expensive mistake.
No football club can.
But if you build your reputation around discipline, structure and ruthless efficiency, repeated reversals in the most important sporting decisions become increasingly difficult to explain.
Carrick was not the mistake
Then came Michael Carrick.
This is where the story requires nuance.
Carrick’s appointment as interim manager in January 2026 was entirely defensible.
He knew Manchester United.
He had coached at the club before.
He had previously taken charge for three matches after Ole Gunnar Solskjaer’s departure.
Most importantly, unlike many former-player appointments, Carrick had subsequently gone elsewhere and actually managed.
He spent two and a half years at Middlesbrough.
His résumé did not make him an obvious long-term Manchester United manager.
But it made him perfectly credible as a stabilising interim appointment.
And Carrick delivered far more than stability.
United won 11 of his first 16 games.
They accumulated more Premier League points than any other side from the moment he took charge and qualified for the Champions League.
Carrick took a club that had been drifting and guided it to third.
That deserves genuine credit.
He earned the conversation about whether he should stay.
The problem is that a successful interim period and a long-term rebuild are not the same job.
In May, United gave Carrick a contract through 2028.
The decision was understandable.
That sentence is becoming familiar.
Carrick had produced results.
The players responded to him.
The atmosphere improved.
Champions League football returned.
Why disrupt something that was working?
But Manchester United had been seduced by short-term evidence before.
An FA Cup final helped reshape the conversation around Ten Hag.
A spectacular 17-game recovery reshaped the conversation around Carrick.
Different circumstances.
Same danger.
A strong run of results can demonstrate that a coach is capable of improving a team.
It does not necessarily demonstrate that he is capable of designing the next version of that team.
Carrick had managed only Middlesbrough before returning to United.
Taking charge of Manchester United permanently meant managing Champions League football, enormous expectations, recruitment decisions, tactical evolution and the pressure that accompanies every poor result at one of the world’s most scrutinised clubs.
INEOS decided the interim evidence was enough.
Now they must live with that judgment.
United are back at the crossroads
The optimism surrounding Carrick has disappeared quickly.
United’s 4-1 Champions League defeat against Como intensified scrutiny around the team’s identity and tactical direction.
Then Bournemouth arrived at Old Trafford and won 3-0.
United have two wins from 12 matches in all competitions this season.
They are one point above the relegation zone.
Carrick is under severe pressure.
Manchester United now face the type of decision INEOS were supposedly brought in to make better.
Do they sack him?
If they do, the permanent appointment will have lasted only months.
Another manager will have been selected, backed and rejected.
Another search begins.
Another philosophy potentially arrives.
Another squad must adapt.
Another expensive reset.
But keeping Carrick simply because dismissing another manager would reflect badly on INEOS would be even worse.
Previous mistakes cannot become justification for the next one.
This is how bad organisations become trapped.
They stop asking what the right decision is and start asking which decision makes the previous decision look less wrong.
Each decision has made the next one harder
That may be the defining feature of INEOS’ Manchester United tenure so far.
Not that every decision was obviously foolish.
Many were not.
Keeping Ten Hag after winning the FA Cup had a rationale.
Appointing Amorim made sense if United wanted one of Europe’s most highly regarded young coaches.
Removing Amorim became understandable once the relationship between coach, system and hierarchy deteriorated.
Carrick deserved enormous credit for what he achieved as interim manager.
Giving him the permanent role had an obvious emotional and sporting logic.
Viewed individually, each choice can be defended.
Viewed together, they reveal something much less convincing.
There has been no consistent managerial philosophy connecting them.
Ten Hag’s football was different from Amorim’s.
Amorim required a radically different squad structure.
Carrick represented another change again.
If Manchester United truly had a football identity established above the coach, changing managers should not require reinventing the team each time.
The coach should fit the structure.
Instead, United continue appearing to choose a coach and then determine what the structure around him should become.
That was supposed to be the old Manchester United.
INEOS cannot keep calling every reset a rebuild
This is the point where responsibility begins moving upward.
Manchester United supporters have spent more than a decade debating managers.
Moyes was not good enough.
Van Gaal was too rigid.
Mourinho became toxic.
Solskjaer reached his ceiling.
Ten Hag lost his way.
Amorim would not adapt.
Carrick may now be overwhelmed by the scale of the permanent job.
Some of those judgments may be correct.
But eventually an institution that repeatedly appoints the wrong manager has to stop treating the manager as the only recurring variable.
INEOS asked supporters to believe that this era would be different because smarter people would finally be making the football decisions.
That promise should be judged by more than job titles and organisational charts.
It should be judged by decisions.
Ten Hag.
Amorim.
Ashworth.
Carrick.
The next one matters enormously.
Because if Carrick is dismissed, the most scrutinised people involved in Manchester United’s next managerial search should not be the candidates walking into Carrington.
They should be the people interviewing them.
The next manager cannot be another idea
Manchester United do not simply need another talented coach.
They need to decide what Manchester United are supposed to look like before deciding who should coach them.
How should they build attacks?
How aggressively should they press?
What profiles should they recruit?
How much tactical flexibility should the coach possess?
Which principles survive when the manager changes?
Those questions should have institutional answers.
Manchester City did not become Manchester City because Pep Guardiola solved every problem himself. The club built an environment whose sporting structure and managerial philosophy eventually aligned.
Manchester United keep searching for transformation in individuals.
INEOS was supposed to end that.
Instead, it has reached October 2026 facing another decision that could define another season.
Perhaps Carrick turns it around.
Perhaps INEOS decides somebody else must try.
Either outcome is possible.
But the larger problem survives him.
Manchester United have spent more than a decade asking whether they have finally found the right manager.
Under INEOS, perhaps the more urgent question is no longer about the person standing beside the touchline.
It is about the people choosing him.
Because Manchester United cannot keep rebuilding until they decide what they are actually trying to build.

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